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The enormous growth in both Soc.i~al Security and private pension plans has
stimulated much interest in the impact of these retirement program~dn
individual saving behavior and the level of national saving. The first issue
is the extent to which employees covered by pension plans reduce their own
direct saving in response to expected retirement benefits; the response of
individuals to guaranteed retirement income will determine, to a large extent,
their well-being in retirement. For a nation concerned about saving and
capita7 formation, the second issue is the impact of collectivized retirement
saving plans on the national saving rate. This impact will depend not only on
individual responses to promised pension benefits, but also on the extent to
which firms undertake direct saving, and, if they do not, the extent to which
shareholders recognize and compensate for unfunded pension liabilities. The
effect of pensions on national saving also requires determinin~ the degree to
which increased saving induced by favorable tax provisiQns exceeds the loss of
government revenues.
This paper wilt lay out the questions that need to be answered in order
to determine the impact of private pension plans on saving, highlight those
aspects of pensions that may complicate the analysis, summarize the results of
empirical research in this area, and finally make recommenda.tions for
improvements in the data.
*Senior Vice P~esident and Director of Research, Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston; and Economist, Aetna Investment Management, respectively. June 1990.
This paper will also appear in the forthcoming volume Pensions and the
Economy: Sources~ Uses~ and Limitations of Data, Zvi Bodie and Alicia H.
Munnell, editors.I. Pensions and Life-Cycle Saving
Many people who favor increased reliance on private as opposed, to public
provision of retirement benefits rest a large portion of their case on the
rapid increase in private pension fund assets. Indeed, the growth has been
extraordinary, from $5 billion at the end of 1945 to over $1.7 trillion by the
end of 1989.I Proponents of private plans imply that the buildup of pension
reserves represents a net increase in saving for the economy. Economic theory
suggests, however, that it may simply reflect a shift in the form of saving.
The life-cycle model predicts that, in an ideal world characterized by perfect
labor and capital markets, no taxes and no uncertainty, people would simply
substitute the increase in their expected pension benefits for their own
saving.2 As will become evident, the level ’of assets in pension funds tells
little about either the well-being of individuals or the impact of private
plans on aggregate saving~
A simple model may help clarify the issues. Suppose the population
consists of individuals who expect to live exactly T years. People begin work
at birth, earn E dollars of compensation per year while at work, and retire at
age R. This leaves workers T-R years in retirement, during which time they
earn no wages. Ignoring interest, an individual’s lifetime income is
tin focusing on the distinction between the public pay-as-you-go social
security program and private funded pensions, the discussion omits any mention
of plans sponsored by state and local governments. These public plans look very
much like those in the private sector and are fairly well funded with assets in
excess of’$600 billion at the end of 1989.
2The life-cycle theory has come under criticism in recent years, primarily
because of the alleged importance of intergenerational transfers as a saving
motive and the apparent lack of asset decumulation on the part of the elderly.
D~spite the furor, this model provides the most useful framework for analyzing
the impact of pensions on saving. For a brief description of the controversy,
see Kotlikoff (1988) and Modigliani (1988).(I) Y : RE
or the product of years at work and earnings per year.
Workers wishing to avoid starvation, during their retirement will save
during their working years.3 According to the life-cycle model, t~~.y will
~’-save ~,nd dissave exactly enough so their annual consumption, C, is~.~.dentical
in each year of their life, including periods of work and retirement:
(2) C = RE.
T
This consumption pattern implies that annual savings while at work will be
(3) S = E - RE = ~ E.
T T
Assume that people live exactly 50 years and typically retire when they
reach age 40 (that is, T=50 and R=40). If they earn $i0,000 a year at work,
in the absence of a pension plan, they will save on their own $2,000 a year
while working in order to maintain a constant consumption level of $8,000
throughout their lives.
Now suppose the employer provides a compensation package that consists of
cash wages, W, and a pension promise, P; that is,
(4) E = W + P.
In this case, an individual’s annual saving, S, will consist of the promised
future benefit from his employer, P, and other saving (OS) done on his own,
(5) S = P + OS.
The first step in sorting out the effect of the introduction of the
pension plan on saving is to determine whether individuals reduce their own
saving, OS, in response to the promised pension benefit. In order to isolate
3The following discussidn assumes no saying for bequests.
3the relationship between pension and non-pension saving, equation 5 can be
rewritten in terms of other saving,
(6)                       OS = S - P = T-R E - P = T-R (W+P) - P
T       T
=T-RW-BP.
T    T
Individuals committed to life-cycle saving will fully offset their own saving
to account for employer-provided pension promises. Using the numerical
assumptions identified above, people receiving pension promises of $2,000 will
save nothing on their own. Similarly, persons receiving $9,000 in wages and
$1,000 in pension promises will save $1,000 in order to bring their total up
to the $2,000 required to maintain a constant level of consumption. (Note
that fully offsetting behavior does not imply a coefficient of -I on the
pension variable.)
What happens in this simple example if people for some reason do not
reduce their saving to offset fully promised pension benefits? Say, for
example, the employer provides a $2,000 pension, and the~mployee reduces his
own saving by only $1,000. In this case, the employee’s consumption during
his worklife falls from $8,000 to $7,000, and consumption during retirement
rises from $8,000 to $12,000. Thus, the response of the employee to promised
pension benefits has significant implications for the well-being of the
individual and, in a growing economy, for the amount of aggregate national
saving.
At the risk of some overstatement, one could argue that it is irrelevant
whether the employer funds or does not fund the plan. Suppose that empl~oyers
were required only to recognize the cost of pension promises as they accrue,
which would be similar to the proposals currently under consideration for
post-retirement health benefits. In this situation, the employer’s income
4statement would show compensation expenses of $10,000, $8,000 in wages and
$2,000 in increased promises of future pension benefits. After paying wages
to the employee, the employer ends ~p with $2,000 in cash, which can be added
to balance sheet assets offsetting the increase in accrued pensio~]iability.
?he employer can thenodo one of three things with this money:.~.make a
contribution to its pension fund, invest the money in the firm, or pay it out
as dividends. In this simpl’e model, none of these transactions should have
any impact on aggregate saving. The first option will involve debiting
corporate assets by $2,000 and crediting the pension fund with the same
amount; the pension fund will hold the money ~ntil the employee retires, at
which time it will pay it out in benefits. Under the second option the firm
can either hold the $2,000 in its vault and pay out the benefits when the
employee retires or it can use the money to buy a machine and sell the machine
when benefits need to be paid. Again, neither of these transactions would
affect saving.
The trickier issue is the effect on aggregate saving if the firm pays out
the entire $2,000 in dividends. The immediate impact W6~Id be a $2,000
increase in the income of shareholders. Without any further adjustments, this
would lead to a $1,600 increase in their consumption and lower national
saving. But, assuming the pension payment were an inescapable commitment,
shareholders would also experience a $2,000 decline in the net worth of their
firm as a result of the creation of a $2,000 unfunded pension liability.
Assuming perfect knowledge about the firm’s future commitments, shareholders
would not increase their consumption, but rather would increase their direct
saving by $2,000 to offset the failure of the firm to save for future pension
expenditures. Through this mechanism, even paying out the recognized cost of
5future pension liabilities in dividends does not alter the conclusion that
pensions need have no effect on national saving.
To summarize. Aggregate saving will be unchanged by the introduction of
pension plans if I) employees and employers correctly perceive the increase in
future income encompassed by pension promises and reduce wages by an
equivalent amount; 2) employees reduce their direct personal saving by the
increased value of future pension benefits; and 3) the firm transfers to the
pension fund or some other firm investment an amount equal to the pension
promise. Alternatively, if the firm chooses not to fund, the "no-effect"
conclusion can still hold if the shareholders recognize that the dividend
payments they receive are offset by the decline in the value of the net worth
of the firm due to the increase in unfunded pension liabilities.4
Gauging the impact of pensions in the real world requires assessing the
extent to which the behavior of markets and of individuals conforms to the
predictions of this simple model. This means answering three questions.
First, by how much do employees receiving part of their compensation in
pension promises reduce their other saving? Second, to what extent do
employers carry out the direct saving by investing either in a pension fund or
in their company assets? And third, to the extent that the company fails to
invest, do Shareholders alter their direct saving to compensate for the
increase in unfunded liability?
4No comparable mechanism is available in the case of pension plans sponsored
by state and local governments. As a result, any shortfall or funding is likely
to lead to lower national saving.II. How Does the Real World Differ from the Simple Model?
Before looking at the existing evidence about the impact of pensions on
saving, it is useful to consider way~ in which the real world and pensions
differ from the simple notions described above. Obvious factors omJ.~ted from
the d~scussion so far are taxes, interest rates, inflation, and uncertainty.
Even expanding the model to include these factors would be insufficient,
however, because pensions themselves have some unique attributes that make
analyzing their impact on saving particularly difficult.
Uncertainty about Benefits
Pensions are extremely complicated; in t~ past this complexity has made
it difficult for employees to have a realistic assessment of the value of
future pension benefits. Insofar as employees are unaware of or underestimate
future retirement benefits, they will not reduce their own saving to offset
their share of pension asset accumulation. On the other hand, an inflationary
environment makes it difficult for people who change jobs frequently and
others to have an accurate assessment of unindexed pension benefits and
workers could just as easily overestimate future real p~sion benefits. Thus,
uncertainty about pension provisions could induce employees to reduce other
saving by either more or less than the increase in their promised future
benefits.
llliquidity of Pension Promises
The neutrality of pensions in the simplified life-cycle model hinges on
the ability of workers for whom pension saving exceeds their desired level of
saving to borrow at market rates against excessive future benefits. Imperfect
capita] markets, however, often prevent people from borrowing freely, thereby
forcing them to save more than they otherwise would. Such forced saving ismost likely to occur among lower-paid workers, who have little saving to
reduce in order to offset excessive pension accumulation. Because these
lower-paid workers cannot borrow against future benefits, they end up saving
more than they would have on their own. In this case pension plans may
increase national saving and capital accumulation.
Even those workers whose desired levels of saving equal pension levels
may not wish to do all their saving through pension plans. Since the
illiquidity of a future pension benefit reduces the substitutability of
pensions for other private saving, people may reduce their own saving by less
than one dollar for each dollar of increase in promised future benefits, and
so contribute to a net increase in aggregate saving.
Induced Retirement
The retirement provisions accompanying private plans also may have
stimulated aggregate saving. The introduction of pension plans has allowed
many workers to retire earlier than they, otherwise would. This early
retirement would be expected to increase saving, since people who retire early
are forced to save at a higher rate over a shorter working life in order to
finance a longer period in retirement. Even if each individual were a perfect
life-cycle saver with zero net saving over his lifetime, with a growing
population aggregate saving would increase because the number of savers would
outnumber the dissavers. Similarly, if incomes were rising, the amount saved
by workers would exceed that dissaved by retirees. Since historically both
the population and real per capita income have tended to increase each year,
the trend toward earlier retirement that has accompanied the growth of private
pension plans would be expected to have increased the rate of saving in the
economy.Pensions as Annuities
Because pensions are usually paid in the form of annuities guaranteed
benefit payments for the remainder 0.~,~ the employee’s life - total saving may
be less than if each worker saved for his own retirement. Without~p~nsion
~’~~°annui~ies, most people would be forced to accumulate sufficient assets to
finance an extended retirement. By pooling risks, gearing retirement ~aving
to the average life expectancy, and offering annuities, pension plans reduce
the total saving required to ensure workers a continuous stream of benefits
during their retirements.
Favorable Tax Provisions
Compensation in the form of deferred pension benefits is treated
favorably under the U.S. personal income tax. By allowing the deferral of
taxes on promised pension benefits until after retirement, compensation in the
form of pension contributions offers three advantages over compensation in the
form of wages. First, the full dollar of contribution without any reduction
for income tax is available for investment during the employee’s working years
- in contrast to the situation in which a dollar is pa~d~in wages and the
employee has only the after-tax dollar to invest. Second, no tax is currently
paid on the investment income from accumulated assets, whereas interest earned
by the employee on ordinary saving is subject to tax as income accrues.
Finally, when benefits are distributed in retirement, they are likely to be
taxed at a lower marginal rate than if they had been taxed as they accrued,s
As a result, those workers who receive a portion of their compensation in
~This phenomenon was considerably mo~e important before the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, which significantl~ reduced the progressivity of the rate schedule.promised pension benefits pay less tax over their lifetime than those who
receive all their compensation in wages.
These tax advantages, in effect, raise the net return on saving through
deferred pension arrangements. Although higher returns create both an income
effect that encourages greater consumption, and a substitution effect that
encourages greater saving, the most common finding among studies on the effect
of interest rates on saving seems to be that the substitution effect somewhat
outweighs the income effect, leading to a small net increase in saving.6
Hence, the favorable tax provisions associated with pensions would be expected
to increase national saving. This intuitive conclusion, however, may not
necessarily be correct. Two factors are particularly relevant in determining
the outcome - the extent to which the highe~ rate of return enters into
people’s saving decisions and the extent to which the tax advantages simply
result in less saving by the government.
Workers for whom pension saving is inframarginal - that is, their desired
levels of saving exceed that provided by social security and private plans -
will experience no change in the rate of return on saving at the margin. For
them the favorable tax provisions for pension saving induces an income effect
but no offsetting substitution effect, so they will reduce their current
saving. On the other hand, employees who want to save less than their social
security and pension will receive an increased return at the margin, and,
assuming the substitution effect dominates, will increase their saving. In
other words, favorable tax provisions for pension plans will lead to a net
increase in saving when pension levels exceed the amount of saving workers
6The best known study finding significant positive interest rate effects is
Boskin (1978).would have done on their own and will lead to a reduction in saving when
pension levels are less than workers’ desired level of saving.
In the United States, pension contributions and benefits tend to be
small. According to data from the 1986 Current Population Survey~.,.~he median
annu~1 private pension benefit received by married couples and sin~g]e
individuals aged 62 to 64 was only $4,930; moreover, only 20 percent df these
beneficiaries received an annual payment in excess of $10,000 (Grad 1988,
table 33, p. 72). Hence, it is highly likely that desired saving exceeds
pension saving for most middle-income and high-income people, and they
experience no change in the rate of return at~th~margin. Thus, the favorable
tax provisions probably have had little effect on aggregate saving.
At the same time, the tax-deferred status of supplementary pension
benefits causes a loss to the Treasury of significant revenues; this loss is
equivalent to a reduction in government saving or an increase in government
dissaving. Although the precise amount of forgone revenues is subject to
considerable controversy, the total is undoubtedly large. For example, the
U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimates that the revenue loss for
1991 (on a cash basis and hence not directly relevant for the current
discussion) will be roughly $47 billion (table C-I, p. A-73)~ On balance,
then, the favorable tax provisions accorded compensation in the form of
deferred pension benefits may not encourage individuals to save more and
almost certainly cause the government to save less, resulting in lower
national saving than if individuals saved on their own.
In short, a variety of complicating factors make it impossible to
determine a priori the effect of pensions on saving. The illiquidity of
pension promises and uncertainty about the value of future benefits raise a
11question as to whether individuals reduce their other saving dollar for dollar
in response to promised future benefits. On the other hand, even if
individuals do undertake fully offsetting behavior, the link between pensions
and retirement behavior may increase aggregate saving in a growing economy
and, in a world of uncertain lifetimes, the fact that pensions are paid as
annuities may reduce national saving. Finally, the introduction of taxes and
particularly favorable tax provisions for compensation in the form of deferred
pension benefits further complicates the analysis; does the higher net rate of
return for pension saving cause employees to increase their total saving? And
to the extent that increased saving occurs, does it compensate fully for the
loss in government revenues from the favorable provisions?
III. What Evidence Do We Have to Date?
The addition of taxes means that four, rather than three, questions need
to be answered in order to determine the effect of pensions on saving. First,
to what extent do employees reduce their own direct savin~ in response to
promised pension benefits? Second, to what extent do employers carry out the
direct saving by investing either in a pension fund or in their company
assets? Third, to the extent that companies fail to invest, do equity prices
decline to reflect the increase in unfunded liability and do shareholders
alter their direct saving to compensate? Finally, do the favorable tax
provisions stimulate enough additional private saving to compensate for the
reduction, in government saving? This section describes the work that has been
do~e to date addressing each of these questions.To What’ Extent Do Individuals Reduce Their Own Savinq?
Most of the empirical work on the issue of pensions and saving has been
geared toward determining whether employees reduce their direct saving in
response to an increase in promised future benefits. The total n~ber of
studi~es, however, are relatively few and almost none incorporate al.] the
desired data.
Despite the widespread acceptance of the life-cycle theory, the view that
individuals might reduce their saving in anticipation of pension benefits is
relatively new. Until quite recently, most experts argued that participation
in any pension plan encouraged people to sa~v~more than they would otherwise.
The authors of a 1968 Brookings study on social security commented, "The
available evidence suggests that, over the long run, individuals covered by
government and industrial pension plans tend to save more than those who are
not covered" (Pechman, Aaron, and Taussig, p. 186). This view, which was
based in part on the historical stability of the savings rate,, was buttressed
by the-results of two cross-sectional studies on the relation between private
pension coverage and saving behavior.
In a 1965 study, Phillip Cagan analyzed the savings response of over
15,000 members of the Consumers Union in 1958-59 and found that those covered
by private pension plans saved more than those not covered. Cagan’s
explanation of the surprising results was that pension coverage calls
attention to retirement needs and prospects and thereby fosters a "recognition
effect" that counteracts individuals’ disinclination to plan for the future.
A study reported by George Katona (1965), based on personal interviews
conducted by the Survey Research Center .of the University of Michigan with
representative samples of all U.S. families in 1962-63, also concluded that
13membership in pension plans stimulates voluntary saving. Katona added a
second explanation for his results, hypothesizing a "goal feasibility" effect,
wherein people intensify their saving efforts the closer they get to their
retirement goal. Katona’s results must be interpreted cautiously, however,
since he focused on a very narrow concept of saving namely, changes in
financial assets. Since the self-employed and farmers, who accounted for 25
percent of the nonmember sample compared to 4 percent of members, would
typically save through investment in their own businesses, this narrow
definition of saving biases the results.
As part of a larger study, Munnell (1974) re-analyzed a subsample of
Cagan’s Consumers Union survey and found results that contradicted Cagan’s
earlier conclusions. Separate equations expqaining total non-pension saving
as a function of income, wealth, a variety of socioeconomic variables, and
pension coverage were esti~mated for three age groups (30-39, 40-54 and 55-64).
The pension variable consistently entered with a negative sign, and the size
and significance of the coefficient increased with the age of the group.
Additional equations were estimated replacing the simple pension coverage
variable with values for expected annual pension benefits; again the pension
variables entered with negative signs.-The main reason for the difference
between these results and those found by Cagan was the ability to use
regression analysis to standardize simultaneously for a large number of other
characteristics such as education, family size, income, age and other factors,
and thereby isolate the impact of pensions.
A second study by Munnell (1976) examined the relationship between
private pension coverage and saving using a sample of men in their
pre-retirement years over the period 1966-71, based on a series of surveysconducted by the U.S. Department of Labor. A major advantage of the Labor
Department data was the inclusion of information on expected retirement age.
The surprising results in the Cagan and Katona studies may have been, in part,
- ~ usually due to the phenomenon mentioned earlier namely, pension coverage....!s
accompanied by earlier retirement; covered employees may simply hay9 increased
their saving in anticipation of earlier withdrawal from the labor force. A
fully specified life-cycle model can make allowances for differences in
expected retirement age between those covered and those not covered by pension
plans. The results of the 1976 Munnell study showed that coverage by private
pension plans discourages saving in other fo~s,~’~t least for the older men
included in that survey, for whom retirement is the primary saving motivation.
Precise estimates of the substitution effect were impossible, however,
since the value of the increase in the promised pension benefits was not
available. A rough estimate was made on the assumption that the increase in
the present discounted value of future benefits was proportional to income for
those covered by a private plan. This reduction was then compared to pension
plan contributions. The implicit, and clearly imprecisei assumption was that
the increase in pension contributions approximates the increase in pension
promises for a given year. Using these assumptions and extrapolating the
behavior of the sample to the entire population, Munnellconcluded that
employees reduce their direct saving by 62 cents for every dollar of increased
pension promises. (Looking back, the precision is somewhat embarrassing in
light of the herculean assumptions.)
Several studies have focused on the relationship between stocks of
pension and non,pension wealth instead of examining annual saving flows; the
results have been mixed. For example, Blinder, Gordon and Wise (1981)
15examined the pattern of asset-holding by age for a sample of 4,130 white men
from the 1969, 1971, 1973, and 1975 waves of the Longitudinal Retirement
History Survey. Despite good asset and income data and a careful application
of the theory, they were not able either to find support for the life-cycle
model or to discern any trade-off between pension wealth and other assets.
Diamond and Hausman (1980), on the other hand, using data from the Labor
Department Survey of Mature Men, did find results consistent with the
life-cycle theory and identified substantial substitution between individual
asset accumulation and pension benefits provided through organized savings
programs. Their results indicated that family wealth was decreased by $5.84
for each dollar of annual pension benefits a family expected to receive after
retirement. To use these results as a basis for calculating the actual offset
between the increase in pension promises and individual direct saving requires
information about the cost of an equivalent annuity. However, a rough
estimate might be that individuals reduce their own saving by 58 cents for
each dollar increase in future promised pension benefits.
Avery, Elliehausen, and Gustafson (1986) examined the relationship
between non-pension net worth and pension wealth using the 1983 Survey of
Consumer Finances, which includes detai.led earnings, asset, and pension
information for 3,800 families. They found that for a subsample of families
headed by a married person age 50 or older each dollar of pension wealth
reduced non-pension net worth by 66 cents. For families with unmarried heads,
however, the regression results indicated only modest substitution (22 cents
reduction in net worth for each dollar increase in pension wealth) and the
coefficient was only marginally statistically different from zero.
16The hypothesis that individuals reduce their own saving in anticipation
of promised pension benefits also found support from studies that-explored the
relationship between private wealth accumulation and social security benefits.
With data from the Federal Reserve Board’s 1963 Survey of Financial
...... ~° Char~teristics of Consumers, Feldstein and Pellechio (1979) relat~ed household
net worth to various measures of income and each household’s net soci~l
security wealth. For employed males between 55 and 64, they found a strong
substitution effect of social security wealth for private wealth. Diamond and
Hausman (1984) found that for each dollar of annual social security benefits
people reduced their saving in other forms by roughly 69 cents. On the other
hand, Blinder, Gordon and Wise (1981) found somewhat less substitution of
social security for private wealth among their sample of men from the
Retirement History Survey. Their estimates indicated that one dollar of
social security wealth displaced approximately 39 cents of other assets, but
their results were not statistically significant. Finally, Kotlikoff (1979)
determined that individuals reduced their other saving by 67 cents for each
dollar of combined employer-employee payroll tax contri~6~tions.
In short, the bulk of the evidence to date provides some support for the
prediction of the simple life-cycle saving model that individuals reduce their
own saving in anticipation of benefits provided through public and private
pension plans. However, with the exception of the Avery, Elliehausen and
Gustafson analysis based on the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances, none of the
studies employed good measures of anticipated pension benefits. Moreover,
most of the studies focused on the behavior of older men for whom retirement
was the primary Jsaving motive; little progress has been made in terms of
assessing the impact of pensions on the saving of the entire population. All
17that can reasonably be said is that some offsetting behavior occurs and that
it is less than dollar for dollar.
To What Extent Do Employers Carry Out Direct Savinq?
Almost no progress has been made toward answering this question. The
problems are twofold. First, assessing the extent to which firms are saving
in advance for future pension commitments requires some measure of the annual
increase in firms’ pension promises or liabilities; although considerable
progress has been made in the area of pension accounting, the improved
measures have only recently been put in place. Second, even with accurate
measures of pension liabilities, the answer to the question of whether f~rms
are saving directly cannot be found by simply looking at the change in the
pension fund accumulations; the relevant focus of analysis is the entire
company and the amount by which both the pension fund and the general treasury
combined have increased their saving.
Pension accountinq. The number required in order to determine the impact
of pensions on national saving is the present discounted Value of pension
promises provided by all employers. Not that long ago the only pension
information provided by companies was an income-statement item indicating the
amount that the company actually transferred to the pension fund. A 1956
pronouncement by the American Institute of Accountants argued that accounting
for pension costs be done on an accrual basis and that past service costs be
amortized over some reasonable period. This pronouncement, however, had
little effect since the accrual concept was applied only to vested benefits
and at that time few plans had vesting provisions.
With the growth of pensions and the confusion created by the use of
numerous divergent methods of accounting, the Accounting Principles Boardcommissioned a comprehensive study which formed the basis for APB Opinion 8,
issued in 1966. The opinion officially endorsed and prescribed the accrual
basis of accounting; thereafter, firms were required to reflect on_their books
a pension charge equal to the normal cost of the plan plus intere~.....on the
firm’ms unfunded actuarial liability. Companies also reported the v~alue of
unfunded accrued vested benefits in a footnote to their financial statements.
The enactment of ERISA, combined with certain perceived deficiencies in
Opinion 8, rekindled interest in accounting for pension costs. Critics
charged that pension cost was not comparably measured company to company and
often not even from period to period for the ~’am~company. In 1980 the
Financial Accounting Standards Board issued statements 35, Accountinq and
Reportinq by Defined Benefit Pension Plans, and 36, Disclosure of Plan
Information, as interim measures to improve the reporting and disclosure of
pension information until a major study of pension accounting could be
completed. These statements required sponsors to disclose more information
about the funding status of pension plans; specifically, they had to show the
actuarial present value of all accumulated plan benefit~and the market value
of plan assets available to pay those benefits. With regard to pension
expense, the statement required sponsors to report any changes in actuarial
cost methods, actuarial assumptions or plan provisions that affected the
comparability of data from one period to the next. However, employers were
free to use any of six actuarial cost methods sanctioned by ERISA for
allocating pension cost to each period.
The most recent product from the FASB pension accounting project is
Statement 87, Employers’ Accountinq for Pensions, issued in December 1985.
This statement requires that net periodic pension costs recognize three
19separate components: service cost, interest cost (interest on the projected
benefit obligation), and actual return on plan assets. The service cost
component represents the increase in promised benefits earned during the
period and is conceptually the same for an unfunded plan, a plan with minimum
funding and a fully funded plan. Moreover, Statement 87 requires that all
plan sponsors use the projected unit credit method for allocating the cost of
benefit accruals to each year of service. In addition to establishing
uniformity, this means that the service cost for final pay and career average
plans will be based on future compensation levels. In addition to identifying
separately the three components of net periodic pension costs, the sponsor
must also disclose the projected benefit obligation, the accumulated benefit
obligation, the vested benefit obligation and the market value of plan assets.
These provisions of Statement 87 became effective in 1987. (Additional
provisions requiring the inclusion of a measure of unfunded liability on the
balance sheet became effective in 1989.)
For the first time, therefore, all companies will beproviding meaningful
and comparable data in a relatively accessible form on the increase in
promised benefits. This information will not only offer an opportunity to
properly define employee compensation and thereby saving, but also, for the
issue under discussion, provide a measure against which to judge whether the
firm undertakes direct saving to fund future benefit payments.
The relevance of pension fundinq. Even with perfect data, simply
comparing~.~he cost of new pension promises with the amount of money
contributed to pension funds cannot provide a meaningful answer to this step
in determining the impact of pensions on aggregate saving. The problem here
is analogous to that which has arisen at the federal level in the attempt to
2Opartially prefund the social security system. Just as it is misleading to
assume that saving occurs because assets are building up in the Social
Security trust funds, it is equally misleading to conclude that firms are
saving simply because they are making large contributions to thei~,~,~nsion
~.,.o-~o-.funds~
In both cases, it is important to explore the activities of the other
parts of the entity. With regard to Social Security, this requires
ascertaining the extent to which the saving in the Social Security trust funds
may be offset by a reduction in saving or an increase in dissaving in the
non-social-security part of the budget. Simil’arly, when assessing the extent
to which the firm is saving, it is important to look at the company as a whole
to ensure that increases in pension assets are not offset by decreases in
other assets or increases in liabilities. In terms of the earlier example, no
saving will occur at the firm level if the company simultaneously makes a
$2,000 contribution to the pension fund and uses $2,000 of existing cashto
pay additional dividends.
The difficulty in assessing the behavior of both th~federal government
and the firm is comparing what actually occurred against a counter-factual
situation. That is, it is necessary to know how much saving or dissaving
would have occurred in the absence of the buildup in the Social Security trust
funds and how large dividend payments would have been in the absence of the
surplus created by the $2,000 deduction for pension expense. In short,
progr.ess in answering this second step in resolving the pension-saving puzzle
may be difficult.Do Shareholders Alter Their Direct Savinq?
Since shareholders have no precise way of knowing whether firms have
increased their unfunded liabilities, getting a definitive answer to this
question is difficult. Nevertheless, on the assumption, presumably, that the
firm does not take offsetting action in the non-pension area, a series of
studies have examined the relationship between unfunded liabilities and share
prices; a reduction in prices is the necessary trigger for individuals to
adjust their own saving behavior to compensate for the failure to save at the
firm level.
To determine whether common stock values reflect pension obligations,
investigators have adopted a model proposed by Modigliani and Miller (1958),
which yields an equation that expresses the market value of a firm’s common
stock as a function of several financial variables. To this traditional
equation subsequent resear.chers have added a variable for the firm’s unfunded
pension obligations.
The first empirical analysis of the effect of a firm’~s unfunded vested
pension benefits on its share price was performed by Oldfield (1977). He
found that for 166 manufacturing firms in 1974 the coefficient on unfunded
vested benefits was negative, was significantly different from zero, and
hovered around -1.5. His estimates indicated that each dollar of unfunded
vested liability reduced share prices by $1.50, which implied that, according
to the stock market, the unfunded liability for vested benefits somewhat
understated the firm’s true unfunded pension obligations. Nearly identical
results were reported by Feldstein and Seligman (1981), who estimated a
similar equation using inflation-adjusted financial data from 1976 and 1977.
A 1982 study by Feldstein and Morck yielded similar results. Gersovitz (1982)estimated an equation like Oldfleld , but allowed for a separate estimation-
of the coefficient for unfunded vested benefits in excess of the amount
insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PGBC). His results
indicated that equity values appear unaffected by the portion of U~,~.unded
~vested benefits above 30 percent of the firm’s net worth. With thi.~_more
elaborate specification, however, the coefficient on unfunded vested b~nefits
became even more negative (-2.3). A recent study by Bulow, Morck, and Summers
(1987), based on a broader data set and a combination of cross-section and
time-series analysis, further confirmed the earlier results that the stock
market valuation of firms reasonably accurateT~ ~’~flects the status of their
pension funding.
Shareholders apparently view a shortfall of pension assets relative to
pension liabilities as a reason to lower the price that they, are willing to
pay for a company’s stock. This may be a reasonable response even though
theoretically it should not matter whether a firm saves in ~the pension fund or
in the non-pension portion of the company. Given the pressure and-tax
advantages to funding, those firms that do not put asidei~adequate assets in
the pension fund are probably not saving elsewhere.
The question still remains about the response of shareholders to the drop
in the value of their equity holdings as a result of the increase in the
firm’s unfunded pension liability. That is, do they increase their direct
saving to compensate for the firm’s failure to save? No empirical information
exists with regard to this link in the chain of questions that need to be
answered in order to determine the effect of pensions on aggregate saving.
23Does Increased Saving Compensate for Government Revenue Loss?
As long as income, as opposed to consumption, is the basis for personal
taxation in the United States, the favorable tax treatment accorded
compensation paid in the form of deferred pension benefits results in a
revenue loss. This loss has a direct impact on national saving, since
government saving - the difference between government receipts and outlays -
is a major component of the total. The loss is large; as noted earlier, the
tax expenditure associated with employer-sponsored pension plans for 1991 is
estimated to be $46 billion.
The tax expenditure estimates currently published by the Treasury and the
OMB are not really the appropriate numbers to consider, however, when
assessing the impact of the favorable tax provisions on saving. These
numbers, which are computed on a cash-flow basis, are designed to measure how
much higher federal revenues would be in a given year if a particular subsidy
had not been enacted. This approach is consistent with the expenditure side
of the federal budget and is meaningful for permanent deductions and
exclusions, but does not properly account for tax concessions in those cases
where tax payments are deferred. Its limitations for qualified pension plans
are seen clearly by considering a situation in which 1) annual contributions
to private plans and pension fund earnings exactly equal benefit payments
during the year, and 2) workers face the same marginal tax rate in retirement
as they do during their working years. Under these assumptions, the revenue
loss as calculated by the Treasury and OMB would be zero. Yet individuals who
receive part of their compensation in deferred pension benefits would continue
to enjoy the advantages of deferral and pay less tax over their lifetimes than
employees who receive all their compensation in cash wages. The deferral isequivalent to an interest-free loan from the Treasury and reduces the present
value of taxes to be collected.
A direct estimate of the annual revenue loss resulting from deferral
would be the difference between I) the present discounted value of the revenue
~,-from the current taxation of pension fund contributions and earnings under
defined contribution plans and accrued pension benefits under defined benefit
plans, and 2) the present discounted value of the taxes collected when
benefits are taxed in retirement. Such a calculation requires assumptions
about the average age of covered workers, the typical retirement age, life
expectancy at retirement, the appropriate intere~ rate, and the marginal tax
rates for workers and retirees. Very crude estimates prepared by Munnell
(1984} showed that, depending on the assumptions, the difference in 1984
between the present vaTues of the two revenue streams ranged from $45 billion
to $62 billion. (The Treasury tax expenditure estimate calculated at that
time on a cash basis for fiscal 1984 was $50 billion.) Annual present value
numbers are needed in order to have a good understanding of the revenue loss
~ ~,-~,~
associated with the favorable tax provisions.
Once the revenue loss is established, the next step is pinning down the
response of individuals to changes in the rate of return to saving created by
the favorable provisions. Although economists agree on the direction of the
response to higher returns, they have not reached a consensus on the magnitude
of this response. An average of extreme estimates (Boskin 1978 and Howrey and
Hymans 1978) would indicate that a 10 percent increase in returns (say from 7
percent to 7.7 percent) would increase the private saving rate by 2 percent
(say from 9.8 percent to 10.0 percent). At today’s levels such a change is
equal to roughly $15 billion. If the relative size of the revenue loss and
25the increased savin~ persists upon closer scrutiny, the favorable tax
provisions may well contribute to lower national saving. Much work remains to
be done on this issue.
Summary
This review of the evidence on the impact of pensions on saving
highlights how little is known beyond the fact that individuals tend to reduce
their own saving in response to anticipated pension benefits and the offset
tends to be less than dollar for dollar. The lack of good information about
the value of expected pension benefits - at least until the advent of the 1983
and 1986 Surveys of Consumer Finances has made it impossible to put a
precise number on the size of the offset.
The individual response is only the first step in determining the impact
of pensions on national saving. For this, it is necessary to know whether the
reduction in individual saying is matched by direct saving by the company,
and, if not, whether shareholders increase their own saving. Finally, the
question of the extent to which the tax expenditure for p~nsions acts as an
effective stimulus for saving needs to be resolved. In short, we know less
about the impact of pensions on saving than we think; a lot more empirical
research is required. In the past, the.research has been driven by the
available data; the next section will discuss the data that are needed to
answer the questions.
IV. How D~ the Data We Have Compare to the Data We Need?
Given ~he advances in the col~ection of pension data and the inclusion of
retirement expectations at the survey level, this section will focus primarily
on the treatment of pensions in the national accounts. In accounting for
26pension transactions in the national accounts, three major considerations
emerge from the preceding discussion about the potential impact of pensions on
saving. The first is the need to distinguish between defined benefit (DB)
plans and defined contribution (DC) plans. The second issue is the~need to
use c6nsistent, accrual-based accounting for the measurement of pension
wealth. The current period increment in this wealth outstanding is th~
relevant component of national saving rather than the flow of benefit payments
from these plans or the employer contributions and investment income inflows
to these plans. Finally, the accounting of th~ current and capital accounts
must be integrated.
Distinction between Plan Types
Currently, no separate information is provided for defined benefit and
defined contribution plans in either the National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA) or their capital account counterpart, the Flow-of-Funds Accounts (FFA)o
Several important differences between these plans argue for their separate
treatment in the national accounts. The most significant distinction is the
residual liability of DB plan sponsors with respect to i;~vestment risk.
Defined contributions plans - by definition - entail no such liability for the
employer.
Differentiation between types of plans is particularly important in the
NIPA accounts. Whereas the increment to pension wealth for DC plans can be
measured by employer and employee contributions, plus investment income earned
on plan assets, this is not the case for DB plans. For a variety of reasons,
employer contributions under defined benefit pTans may differ significantly
from the pension rights accrued in a given year. Beginning in 1980, for
example, employers significantTy slowed their contributions to defined benefit
27plans, as substantial capital gains on pension fund assets raised funding
ratios. Since benefit accruals did not-slow, this phenomenon caused
NIPA-measured personal income and saving to understate the increment to
individuals’ pension wealth. Without the boom in the stock market and the
strong bond market, contributions to private pension plans in 1986 would have
been nearly $30 billion higher than reported (Munnell and Ernsberger 1987).
Adding this amount in personal income and saving raises the 1986 saving rate
from 4.3 to 5.3 percent. Accrual-based accounting for DB plans in the NIPA
would avoid such distortions.
Under current Flow-of-Funds accounting, differentiation of plan types is
less necessary, since the accounts refer only to the assets funding each plan
type. The separate treatment of defined contribution plans, however, would
help to sharpen the differences between these two br~ad classes of
employer-sponsored plans. ~From the Flow-of-Funds’ capital account
perspective, moreover, the separate treatment of defined contribution plans
would reinforce the similarities between these employer sponsored plans and
"individual-sponsored" plans such as the familiar IRA and Keogh arrangements.
Accountinq for Pension Benefits
The foundation for a meaningful representation of pensions in the
National Income and Product and Flow-of-Funds Accounts is consistent with
accrual-based accounting for pension claims. Under such an approach, benefit
accruals would represent the pension component of personal income and, in
turn,-personal saving.
As noted earlier, for defined contribution plans the pension-related
component of personal income is simply the sum of employers’ contributions and
the investment income of the assets currently funding these plans.Individual-sponsored retirement arrangements, including IRA-Keogh
arrangements, can be treated in a parallel fashion. For private
employer-sponsored defined contribut!~on plans, the accounting approach
outlined above is consistent with the treatment implicitly accorde,d,..~:these
~’plans~’~in the NIPA. That is, the National Income Accounts currently.,~ecognize
as personal income the employer contributions to and investment income from
all private sector pension plans, including both defined benefit and defined
contribution arrangements. Investment income earned by IRA-Keogh type plans,
as well, in effect is included in personal income since the NIPA add an
estimate of income earned on th~se tax-deferred accounts to tax basis personal
income reported by the IRS.
For defined benefit plans, the current NIPA treatment diverges markedly
from the accrual-based pension wealth approach, since employers’ residual
liability for provision of defined benefits serves as a wedge between the cash
basis contributions plus investment income flow and the accrual of these
plans’ benefit obligations. On an accrual basis, the personal income arising
from DB pension-covered employment in the current peri~d~is the present
discounted value accrual of individuals’ pension claims against defined
benefit plans. As illustrated above, financial markets-induced variations in
plans funding levels can cause this accrual measure of pension saving for DB
plans to diverge quite widely from the employer contributions plus investment
income measure currently used i.n the NIPA.
The switch to an explicit benefit liabilities measure of households’
pension wealth would also remove much of the pronounced fluctuations in
pension wealth currently reported in the FFA. For example, less than 30
percent of the $190 billion decline in pension wealth currently reported in
29the FFA to have occurred as a result of the October 1987 stock market plunge
would remain after conversion to accrual-based benefit claims accounting.
Inteqrated Treatment of the Current and Capital Accounts
From a capital account perspective, accrual-based pension accounting
represents not only households’ defined benefit pension wealth but also the
pension sector’s DB pension liability. This pension wealth liability claim
measure provides a much more meaningful accounting linkage between households
and the pension sector than does the funded assets measure of pension wealth
currently used in the Flow-of-Funds Accounts. Moreover, this 7iability
measure when combined with an estimate of the assets funding defined benefit
plans effectiveTy links DB pension plans’ capital position to the sponsoring
business sectors by showing an explicit unfunded liability of the business
sector.7
This approach to accounting for defined benefit pensions clarifies the
relationship between these plans’ capital account and their more familiar
current account. Since only benefit accruals are relevant in these plans’ net
saving, sponsors’ asset funding decisions are clearly seen as a purely capital
account transaction, albeit one with a sign,ificant impact on business taxes
due to the deductibility of qualified pension contributions as a business
expense.
7This unfunded pension liability measure, of course, has some serious
shortcomings for the analysis of pension policy. If summed across the population
of all defined benefit plans, overfunding of some plans will tend to mask the
more serious underfunding of other plans, implicitly assuming that overfunded
pension monies still are the asset of sponsoring firms. One partial solution is
to show separate under-and-over funding positions with the overfunded amount
treated as residual net worth of the pension sector. Largely separate pension
asset and liability calculations entail a further, potentially serious,
complication of ignoring the efficiences that can be obtained by asset-liability
immunization strategies.Thfs approach contrasts with the FFA’s current use of pension funds’
assets as a proxy for pension wealth since employer contributions are linked
only to tax-basis current account re~orting of qualified pension
contributions. Under the current NIPA-FFA scheme, moreover, the employer
~’Contri~butions that are not qualified for deduction as a business expense under
IRS maximum funding limitations would not be captured in NIPA employer"
contributions data, producing a potentially sizable discrepancy in the FFA’s
sources and uses of funds balance for the household sector.
Explicit recognition of DB plan overfunding in the Flow-of-Funds Accounts
would help to greatly clarify the treatment o~~pension asset reversions in the
NIPA-FFA. At present, reversion funds are completely excluded from NIPA
measures of business income under the assumption that these pension-derived
receipts are entirely attributable to capital gains on the assets funding the
plans. Given current FFA procedures, however, these reversion inflows to the
corporate sector are captured as a use of funds without a corresponding source
of funds.
In addition to providing an accounting framework fo~the late 1980s’
pension asset reversion experience, DB plans’ proposed capital account
treatment would help to clarify the distinction between the plan sponsor, the
plan trustee, and the Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). While the
sponsoring corporation bears the investment risk and residual liability for
provision of defined benefits for ongoing plans, it is important to adopt a
capital account structure in which the PBGC can be integrated.
Current Flow-of-Funds treatment fails to incorporate the PBGC’s capital
account and makes no provision for transfer of plan assets when default by a
sponsor occurs. Accurate benefit liability and plan asset estimates are
31especially important in these cases. Since PBGC-insured benefits typically
fall short of total plan benefits, a decline in households’ pension wealth
must be recognized when default occurs. The proposed measure of the PBGC’s
capital account, together with a measure of the DB pension sector’s aggregate
underfunding, would be very useful in putting this federal pension insurance
operation in perspective.
Summary
The current treatment of pensions in the national accounts deviates
substantially from the conceptual ideal and much of the analysis of pensions
and pension policy has been distorted by the lack of appropriate data. Early
studies relating measured private saving to pension saving (the increase in
the book value of pension fund reserves) were based on notions of income,
saving and pension activity that differ greatly from those implied by the
theory. The intense interest in pension fund assets as an indication of the
contribution of pensions to national saving is another example where the mere
availability of the data has driven the analysis.
The significant improvements in pension accounting and reporting create a
wonderful opportunity to improve the data on pensions included in the national
accounts. Careful analysis will be needed to determine the precise measure of
pension accruals that should be adopted, but moving away from exclusive
reliance on cash concepts should greatly enhance our ability to understand the
role of pensions in the workings of the economy.
V. Conclusion
It is difficult to carry out economic analysis based primarily on accrual
concepts in a world where activity is reported on a cash basis. Particularlyin the pension area, the personal income and saving statistics produced by the
National Income Accounts differ substantially from the concepts used in most
economic analyses. In the corporate_sector, cash accounting tends to distort
the measurement of pension commitments and thereby corporate profi~.~
~"~°Accou~ts based on cash also fail to recognize the relationship between the
federal government and the household and business sectors created by the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation insurance. Finally, tax expenditure
estimates based solely on a cash flow analysis do not provide an accurate
measure of the benefits of the tax-favored treatment of pensions.
The time is right for improving the data~n pensions. Great strides have
been made in the area of cross-sectional surveys of individuals; these
improvements should permit better estimates of the extent to which employees
reduce their other saving in response to guaranteed pension benefits.
Comparable improvements are needed at the macro level; revising our national
accounts to make use of available data should be given high priority.
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